The 1938 Dalfram Pig-iron Dispute and Wharfies Leader, Ted Roach

Greg Mallory

(This article is an edited version of a paper presented to ‘On the Waterfront: Union Gains and Struggles 1890-1998’, a conference organised by the Sydney Branch of the Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Sydney University, 20 February, 1999.)

When Communist Party activist Ted Roach was elected Secretary of the Waterside Workers’ Federation (WWF) South Coast Branch in January, 1938, he immediately began to organise industrial campaigns, agitating for an end to the infamous ‘bull’ system and for the introduction of a roster system for the Port Kembla wharves. The year before, under pressure from Roach and fellow unionists, the stevedoring companies had agreed to a ‘union shop’, thus placing the port under near-complete union control.1 The union roster system gave the men the freedom to agitate, as the fear of victimisation was removed. A strict code of discipline operated within the union. Fines were imposed on men who did not follow the rules governing the roster or who acted irresponsibly on the job. This became known as “fronting the red beards”.2 The industrial struggle was organised around a ‘programme for immediate demands’ which meant that whenever one particular gain was made another campaign would immediately take place for the next demand.3 For example, according to Roach, when the branch won the roster, the leadership immediately started on a campaign for ‘rotation of hatches’.

Within months, developments internationally were to propel these local struggles onto the national stage, setting the WWF on to a collision course with the Lyons Federal governments and placing severe internal strains on the WWF itself.

Japanese Militarism, the Waterside Workers’ Federation and the Dog Collar Act Following Japan’s invasion of China in 1937, the WWF had began a nationwide campaign of militant action in response to the Japanese aggression. In September 1937, Fremantle wharfies refused to load supplies on a Japanese whaler. The slogan ’No Scrap for the Jap’ began to appear on wharves around the country. In October 1937, the Federal Conference of the Federation delegated the Federal Committee of Management (FCOM) and the WWF delegates to the ACTU ‘to act in conjunction with the ACTU in organising an embargo or boycott of Japanese imports and exports.’ In that month, Sydney wharfies walked off the Tamon Maru when they learned that scrap iron was on board and destined for Japan.4 Other bans were applied in Port Adelaide, Hobart and Brisbane. On 18 January 1938, Sydney wharfies refused to load ‘lead bars and tin clippings’ onto the Melbourne Maru. They argued that these materials were being used for war purposes against the Chinese and in particular, against the civilian population.5 In Brisbane, a wharfie refused to handle this material and his registration disc was taken from him. It was restored to him after a protest meeting was called and the Brisbane Branch reaffirmed it would not handle the material. A number of other branches supported this position including the Melbourne and South Coast Branches. In addition, Melbourne wharfies refused to load scrap iron on to a German ship in May 1938.6

However the threat of the implementation of the Transport Workers’ Act (known to working people as the ‘Dog-Collar Act’) discouraged the WWF from taking more militant action. This Act stipulated that only licensed wharfies could be employed in particular ports specified by the Government. If a licence was taken out and wharfies did not comply with the licensing provisions (which stipulated that all lawful orders had to be carried out), then the licence could be revoked. Thus, if wharfies took out licences, they would sign away their right to strike.

Roach was of the view that because of the Act’s draconian provisions, the FCOM was intent on discouraging local branches from staying out over this issue. Indeed, Roach maintained that FCOM actually ordered local branches back to work:

Because each time they (the Federation) made a move – the Dog-Collar Act would hunt ‘em back to work, directed by Jim Healy and the Federal Committee of Management.7

However, Roach was determined to handle the political situation from a local perspective and was not prepared to be dictated to by an ‘outside’ body. He and his fellow branch members were thus intent on pursuing local action through local decision making.

It does seem that FCOM was intent on finding a solution that would avoid the dire effects of the Transport Workers’ Act. On 24 May, 1938, G. Mullins, the Sydney Branch Secretary, advised FCOM that a mass meeting of the Sydney Branch had condemned the Federal Government for forcing its members to load war materials bound for Japan but that the Branch has also agreed to load the cargo under duress.8 The Sydney Branch’s decision to resume work shows the enormous amount of pressure placed on the union by the spectre of the Transport Workers’ Act. The Sydney Branch was not prepared to challenge the penalties of this Act. The banning of pig-iron to Japan was unable to be implemented by the Sydney Branch. At Port Kembla, however, events took a radically different turn.

The Dalfram Walk-Out
On 15 November 1938, the British tramp steamer Dalfram berthed at No. 4 jetty in Port Kembla. Mitsui, the controlling company for Japan Steel Works Ltd. had chartered the vessel to take pig-iron from Port Kembla to Kobe, Japan. The shipment was part of a contract to provide the Japanese steel mills with 300,000 tons of pig-iron. Japan Steel Works was producing military materials for the undeclared war in China.

When the ship docked in Melbourne, Charlie Young, a militant Melbourne wharfie, advised Jim Healy, General Secretary of the Federation, and Ted Roach, South Coast Secretary, that the ship was bound for Port Kembla. The South Coast Branch had already made clear its attitude on this matter. When the ship arrived in Port Kembla the wharfies were called together by Ted Roach. Roach recalled that when the Dalfram came in:

I called the boys together in the lane …. and that morning I jumped a stump and said to the boys there was a ship coming in, and there was pig-iron for Japan, and our policy is clear, ‘What do you think we should do about it?’… and of course I moved a resolution that we don’t load it – but then cautioned that we accept work, we go back to work and commence work normally, to allow me to authenticate this information by moving amongst the crew and so on. You see – we didn’t want to make any mistakes…. And the boys started loading this pig-iron and they were getting “toey” about it and by the time I had finished, about a quarter past eleven – I had been down with the lascars – you see, the native crews – I finished up convinced that they were going to Kobe, so I just walked up on deck and I said ‘Right-o-boys, it’s going to Kobe’. To a man, everything stopped, and now they marched straight off the bloody ship. Hey, we had no idea we were making history.9

The employer’s response was to individually harass the men as they walked off the ship. But this action was unsuccessful as the men remained firm in their resolve. The next day, when the men went to the ‘pick-up’, the Dalfram was first on the roster. When no labour was forthcoming for the Dalfram, the employers refused to call labour for any new ships, in effect imposing a lock-out.10

Tensions Within the Union
The FCOM meeting in Melbourne received news of the ‘walk-out’ on the afternoon of 15 November and requested that they submit a report on this action. On 16 November, Ted Roach phoned the FCOM and told them that they had reaffirmed their action and had received support from the crew of the Dalfram and from the local metal workers. The FCOM ‘decided to leave the matter in abeyance pending further Reports’. At this point, pressure was applied to the FCOM to convince the Port Kembla WWF members to go back to work. Attorney-General Menzies asked the FCOM to order the men back to work. Menzies added that the walk-out placed in jeopardy any discussion on the repeal of the Transport Workers’ Act.11

On 27 November, 1938, the South Coast Branch reaffirmed its stand on the Dalfram and decided to call a public meeting on the threat of licences being applied under the Transport Workers’ Act. General Secretary Healy conveyed this news to the FCOM on 29 November, and the Committee issued a public statement attacking the Lyons government’s policies on the export of war materials to Japan and reaffirming the union’s opposition to the Transport Workers’ Act.12 On 1 December Healy reported that there was growing support for the South Coast Branch’s actions.13

According to Roach, FCOM wanted the men to go back to work but, when confronted with a determined local branch, was forced to give support.14 He was of the opinion that a different situation existed to that of other ports. According to Roach:

the Committee of Management wanted to order us back, but, of course, Healy knew he was not dealing with the people he always dealt with and he said to the Committee of Management, you’ve got to come down and order them back yourselves. Well, then, I was the first cab off the rank to the meeting and by the time I went down I had ‘em guaranteeing, I got ‘em into a guarantee of 3000 pounds worth of food – it was only a guarantee, but it was a political victory for us down there over the bloody right-wing Committee of Management.15

Clearly, the leadership of the Port Kembla Branch saw the political situation differently from their Sydney counterparts. The Port Kembla Branch broke new ground by implementing decisions made at the local level, thereby setting the agenda for the FCOM.

Taking on the Transport Workers’ Act
The Federal Government threatened to use the Transport Workers’ Act to break the strike. Menzies wired the Federation on 29 November and advised them to take notice that the Transport Workers’ Act would be applied to Port Kembla from 6 December if the pig-iron was not loaded. The Federal Government accused the WWF of dictating foreign policy, arguing that, as the elected government, it had the sole right to decide what relationships were to be established with foreign powers.16 Healy, accompanied by Roach, met with Menzies on 7 December, when Menzies again threatened them with the provisions of the Transport Workers’ Act.17

On 5 December the FCOM sent a lettergram to Federal Parliamentary Labor Party leader John Curtin seeking support.18 However, according to Roach, Curtin talked to them as if they were a bunch of ‘naughty boys’ and said, “If we were the Government, you would still have to load pig-iron”.19 Another meeting of the local branch on 7 December, 1938, with General Secretary Jim Healy in attendance, reaffirmed its previous position of refusing to load pig-iron and passed the following motion :

that requests be sent to Curtin asking that pressure be brought to bear on Lyons to force a referendum on the question of the export of war materials to aggressive nations & the repeal of the Transport Workers Act.20

A FCOM telegram was received on 7 December asking the South Coast Executive if it was prepared to allow the FCOM to take over the dispute and involve other branches. Both Lockwood and Roach subsequently claimed that conservative elements within the FCOM were frightened of a confrontation with the Government and wanted a return to work.22 Healy urged FCOM on 8 December to pass a resolution of support for the men. It did so by passing the following motion:

That the COM, although having no say in the creation of the present situation as existing at Wollongong, find themselves faced with the situation that an attempt is being made to enforce the provisions of the Transport Workers’ Act on the Wollongong Branch, and the issue now becomes a question of a fight against the Transport Workers’ Act. The Committee therefore supports the principle for which the men are fighting.23

This motion mentions nothing about the real principle for which the men were fighting and indicates that FCOM’s support was, at best, lukewarm.

The Transport Workers’ Act was applied at Port Kembla on 7 December, 1938. Only one licence was taken out and Roach convinced the member concerned to hand over his licence so that it could be burned publicly in front of the Customs House.24 Immediate support came from other unions and the wharves were declared black.25 As a consequence, the Transport Workers’ Act was seen to be ineffectual, and this was proved to be one of the great victories in the dispute.

Machinations in the Sydney Branch
On 12 December, 1938, a report was received from Sydney Branch Secretary Mullins advising the FCOM that WWF members had refused to accept work on the S.S. Nellor as they believed that its cargo was connected with the pig-iron dispute at Port Kembla. Mullins had contacted the Shipping companies and had been advised that the pig-iron was not destined for Japan but was to be discharged in Shanghai. Mullins then requested the FCOM to order the men back to work and stated that the ‘trouble’ had been caused by outside people.26 The FCOM felt that it was inadvisable to stop loading the cargo but decided to discuss the matter with the ACTU before making a decision. Mullins rang the FCOM on 13 December ‘complaining’ that the men were still refusing to load the cargo and had refused to load another ship, the Taiping. He requested a directive from the FCOM ordering them to work. After discussing the matter with the ACTU, the FCOM cabled the Sydney Secretary the following motion:

A.C.T.U. and Committee of Management have carefully examined particulars of pig iron cargo Nellor and Taiping and in view of guarantees and undertakings received from the employers are of the opinion that these cargoes are not intended for Japan and therefore not involved in Port Kembla dispute – stop – accordingly direct members to work these cargoes.27

Both Roach and Lockwood state that the rank and file did not follow this directive. Lockwood also contends that railway shunters refused to handle the pig-iron and both the Nellor and the Taiping sailed without the pig-iron. It appears that this was the pig-iron that was meant to be taken to Kobe by the Dalfram because it came from Port Kembla.28

The FCOM took their meeting to the Sydney Branch office on 15 December and the Executive of the Sydney Branch was invited to sit in at this meeting.29 The FCOM thought that the Sydney members believed that the cargo was declared ‘black’ by the Port Kembla men. The rank and file were reprimanded for their actions for not taking directions from the FCOM. At the FCOM meeting on 19 December the following motion from the Sydney Branch was considered:

That this Branch of the Federation supports the stand taken by the South Coast Branch and emphatically condemn the action of the Lyons Government in introducing the Transport Workers’ Act at Port Kembla. We hereby advise the Sydney employers that whilst the Sydney Branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation is at all times prepared to work in terms of the current award we will not accept engagement to work cargoes refused by our Port Kembla members and/or diverted from that Port whilst the present dispute is continuing.30

It was reported that the Nellor and Taiping had sailed without the cargo of pig-iron. It was felt that it was not necessary to hold the stop-work meeting.31

The Dispute Escalates
At a joint meeting of the FCOM and the South Coast branch on 16 December, 1938, the Branch Executive made it clear to the FCOM that the members had resolved not to load pig-iron onto any ship destined for Japan and that they would stand by this decision. The local Executive reported that there was wide public sympathy for their actions, including local union support. At this point, the FCOM decided to give full support to the Port Kembla members.32

However, on 17 December BHP laid off 4000 men claiming that the Dalfram dispute was responsible for bringing everything to a standstill. The WWF countered that BHP’s actions amounted to a ‘lock-out’ and an attempt to sway public opinion against the wharfies. On the same day, the FCOM heard a report on a Combined Unions Committee’s meeting at Wollongong. The FCOM appointed A. Finlay as its delegate to the Combined Unions Committee and passed a resolution calling on the ACTU to rally the Australian trade union movement behind the actions of the Port Kembla men.34 On 19 December, the FCOM placed a levy of 1 shilling on all members in order to finance the Port Kembla dispute.

The situation of having over 4000 men out of work over the Christmas period placed enormous strains on the local community. Relief schemes were set up and donations were received from all over Australia.35 The Port Kembla wharfies had already won wide support by participating in community activities such as fighting bushfires, digging air-raid shelters and helping farmers in times of difficulty.36

A Wharfies’ Escort for ‘Pig-Iron Bob’
After the Christmas period, Attorney-General Menzies made an attempt to settle the dispute by calling a meeting with the Combined Union Committee at Wollongong for 11 January, 1939. On that day, the Committee organised a large demonstration and the entire township was mobilised for Menzies’ arrival. Roach described the preparations thus:

… the miners had a holiday, and all the school-kids had a holiday this day for Menzies coming down – and the place was full of people and we got Stan Speechly on his fast motor-bike up the top near the Panorama Hotel, to let us know – as soon as he has come, Stan was going to whip down and let us know – and there were little demonstrations all along the coastline in little miners’ villages.37

When Menzies arrived in Wollongong, he was met by an angry demonstration of over 1000 people. Roach recalls wharfies directing traffic and taking over point duty. Menzies visited the Wollongong Hotel, where he was to have lunch with the Mayor and other local dignitaries. The demonstrators held banners outside the hotel which read ‘No Pig-iron for Japan’ and ‘No Dog Collar’. It was here that Menzies acquired the name ‘Pig-Iron Bob’. Ted Roach claimed38 that the epithet was first used by Mrs. Gwendoline Croft, a member of the local women’s relief committee. It was later picked up by the Rev. Bill Hobbin, a former Methodist minister, and Stan Moran, the well-known wharfie and communist Domain orator.39

After Menzies had finished lunch, he was to meet with the WWF Committee across the road in the Town Hall. The demonstrators grew rowdy and the police were concerned for Menzies’ safety. Inspector Roser, who was in charge of the police, approached Ted Roach and asked him if he could guarantee Menzies’ safety. Roach said that he would arrange a path through the crowd. He organised some wharfies, who incidentally were Communist Party members, to clear a path.40 Roach recalled the incident in these terms: ‘The irony of this! Menzies, number one Red-baiter, had to be protected by a communist’.41 As Menzies walked across the road, he was abused by everyone, including women and children. At the meeting with the union officials, he stressed that the Government decided foreign policy and not the WWF. At the conclusion of the meeting, Menzies was escorted back to the hotel by Communist Party members.42

Success on Both Fronts
Menzies had intimated at the Wollongong meeting that the Government would review its policy and withdraw licences from Port Kembla.43 A formula was negotiated and at a special meeting of the South Coast Branch on 17 January, Ted Roach proposed the following motion:

that we recommend the acceptance of the proposals and furthermore that in the event of a future attempt being made to ship any further contracts that we emphatically refuse to handle it.44

This motion was lost 100 to 54.45 However, with the increasing hardships experienced by the workers at BHP as a result of the shutdown, on 21 January 1939 the wharfies decided to load the pig-iron ‘under protest’. The accord stipulated that the licences were to be withdrawn from the port and there would be discussions with Menzies about future shipments.46

On 24 January, Jim Healy met with Government representatives and received an unofficial assurance that no more pig-iron would be shipped to Japan.47 There is some contention as to whether this promise was kept. Roach asserts that a ban was placed on the remaining 277,000 tons.48 Lockwood claims that two other ships, the Tymeric and Alynbank arrived at Port Kembla after the Dalfram left in order to load the remaining pig-iron. The wharfies loaded these ships under protest.49 However both Beasley and Sutherwood-Claridge claim that more shipments of ore were sent to Japan. Beasley states that in April 1939, the Townsville Branch loaded metal concentrates for Japan under the threat of the Transport Workers’ Act.50 Sutherwood-Claridge claims that BHP sent 70,000 tons of scrap metal and pig-iron to Japan between 1939 and 1940.51

Consequences of the South Coast Wharfies’ Stand
There were a number of significant political and industrial consequences arising from the strong stand taken by Roach and his fellow branch members during this dispute. Firstly, the WWF South Coast Branch showed that the Transport Workers’ Act was ineffectual when workers collectively stood up against it. As Ted Roach argued when the Branch was first threatened with the Act:

I said to the boys, let us not worry, we have this situation well in hand here – penal legislation is only as dangerous as the resistance to it is weak – we have the trade union position lined up so strongly here.52

The main reason for such strong support was that the industrial and political work that had been undertaken previously had galvanised an active political membership. This action set an example to other branches. As the Maritime Worker observed:

It will also indicate to the members of the Federation generally that the threat of the Transport Worker’s Act does not necessarily preclude the right of our members to use their industrial organisation for the purpose of maintaining their democratic rights and privileges.53

A second outcome of the dispute was the dissemination of militancy. For Roach, victory in the roster struggle and the pig-iron dispute had implications for the rest of the Federation. Roach contended that when Port Kembla wharfies were transferred to other ports, they brought this kind of militancy to their new workplace.54 Some of these men became delegates and subsequently agitated against the ‘bull’ system and for a roster system. Thus this militancy was exported to other ports, and the Federation grew in strength. This was certainly a view promoted very strongly by Roach himself:

I could give you a dozen examples – and they took the message out and all the building of the rosters – that was the most single thing in strengthening the Federation – the implementation of rosters everywhere – it took it out of the bosses’ hand, the ability to victimise and coerce members – it gave them a new lease of life as independents, and strength developed in that independence, the boss couldn’t sack them, and the union grew with this.55

Wharfies who had taken part in the pig-iron dispute and other associated struggles went on to become Federation officials at other ports. The lessons learnt at Port Kembla were transferred to their official activities at other branches. They drew on their experience at Port Kembla in their everyday work and this situation led to the Federation becoming more militant organisation nationally and locally.

Thirdly, the pig-iron dispute led the WWF towards a more militant involvement in the political sphere. After the Second World War the union became involved in industrial actions throughout Australia in support of Indonesian independence. These actions tied up Dutch ships at Australian ports for a significant length of time.56 In 1948 it took industrial action in support of the railway workers in Queensland, and in 1949 Jim Healy and Ted Roach were gaoled for supporting the Coal Strike. The year 1950 saw the WWF supported by the Communist Party in its fight against the Menzies Government’s attempt to ban it. Roach was also gaoled in 1951 for publishing a cartoon in Maritime Worker critical of a Federal Industrial Court Judge’s ruling.57 All of these actions enhanced the reputation of the WWF as being a militant union both industrially and politically and in 1954 the Federal Government moved to curb its power by changing the method of recruitment to the industry.

Finally, the dispute was very revealing of the tense relationship between the officials of the South Coast Branch and the FCOM. Oral evidence suggests that the officials and members of the South Coast Branch were the prime movers behind the struggle against the Transport Workers’ Act. But it was also a profoundly local struggle. Roach was particularly concerned to assert local autonomy and to uphold grass-roots democracy within the WWF. Roach and the South Coast Branch ‘broke new ground by ‘going it alone’. However, it was obviously necessary to work with the FCOM in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion . It may be argued that, in this dispute, local action coupled with spirited negotiation forced Federal officials to follow the local initiative. A crucial point is the contrast between the officials of the Sydney Branch and the South Coast Branch. Sydney Branch Secretary Mullins requested the FCOM to order the men to load pig-iron, whereas Roach and the South Coast rank and file were determined to ‘hold out’ as long as possible.

To the end, Ted Roach maintained that the pig-iron dispute was a complete political victory:

In a different era, and in changed circumstances, we met the reactionary government and the monopolies head on and, in the process, we struck heavy blows for democracy and destroyed a strike breaking, union destroying system of licensing. We concluded the battle with no physical casualties and emerged as a much stronger organisation. We won a political victory of enormous national and international importance.58


  1. Gary Griffith, ‘The Growing Militancy of the South Coast Branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation: 1930-1939’ B.A. (Hons) Thesis, University of Wollongong, 1982, p.69.
  2. Ibid., pp.69-70.
  3. Roach Interview, September, 1990.
  4. Rupert Lockwood, War on the Waterfront: Menzies, Japan and the Pig-iron Dispute, Sydney, Hale & Ironmonger, 1987, pp.107-109.
  5. WWF Federal Office File, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National University (NBAC/ANU), T62/1/3, Jim Healy’s Report to the Federal Committeeof Management (FCOM), 23 May 1938, pp. 1-4. Healy forced a modification of the Sydney Branch’s and contacted Menzies who accepted this.
  6. Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, Jim Healy’s Report.
  7. Ted Roach Interview: September, 1990. During this interview and subsequent discussions with Ted Roach, he has presented a position which was well to the ‘left ‘ of the Federal officials.
  8. Ibid., WWF Federal Office File, 23-25 May.
  9. Ted Roach Interview, September 1990.
  10. Roach Interview, September 1990 and Griffith, ‘The Growing Militancy of the South Coast Branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation’, p.81; Roach Interview, September 1990.
  11. WWF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, FCOM Minutes, 15, 16 & 18 November, 1938.
  12. WWF South Coast Branch Minutes, NBAC/ANU Z429 Box 53, Minutes of Special Meeting, 27 November,1938.
  13. WF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, FCOM Minutes, 1 December, 1938.
  14. Roach Interview, September 1990. Also in Roach, ‘Menzies and Pig-iron for Japan’, in The Hummer, vol.2, no.2, Winter, 1994, p. 7.
  15. Roach Interview, September, 1990.
  16. Lockwood, War on the Waterfront, pp.140-141.
  17. WWF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, FCOM Minutes, 7 December, 1938.
  18. Ibid., 5 December.
  19. Roach Interview, September 1990. Menzies at that time was Attorney-General and Minister for Industry.
  20. WWF South Coast Branch File, NBAC/ANU Z 429 Box 53, Minutes of Special Meeting, 7 December, 1938.
  21. WWF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, FCOM Minutes, 7 December, 1938.
  22. Lockwood, War on the Waterfront, p. 146; Roach Interview, September 1990.
  23. WWF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, FCOM Minutes, 8 December, 1938.
  24. Ibid., 7 December, 1938.
  25. Griffith, ‘The Growing Militancy of the South Coast Branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation’, p.81.
  26. WWF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, Minutes of FCOM, 12 December, 1938.
  27. Ibid., 13 December, 1938.
  28. E. C. Roach, ‘Menzies and Pig-iron for Japan’,p.10; Lockwood, War on the Waterfront, pp. 148-149.
  29. WWF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, FCOM Minutes, 15 December, 1938.
  30. Ibid., 19 December, 1938.
  31. Ibid.
  32. WWF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, Minutes of FCOM meeting, 16 December, 1938.
  33. Lockwood, War on the Waterfront, p.42 & 156-157.
  34. WWF Federal Office File, NBAC/ANU T62/1/3, Minutes of FCOM meeting, 17 December, 1938.
  35. Lockwood, War on the Waterfront, p.160.
  36. Roach Interview, September 1990.
  37. Ibid.
  38. Tony Stephens, ‘Pig Iron Memories Bob Back Up’, Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July 1993.
  39. Menzies attributed it to Stan Moran as it was used most frequently in Moran’s speeches in the Domain in the the 1940s and the 1950s. Interview with Stan Moran, Mt. Druitt, NSW, June 1991.
  40. Paul McInerney, ‘Ted ‘s outburst gave Menzies Pig Iron tag’, Illawarra Mercury, 6 February 1993.
  41. Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July 1993; Roach ‘Menzies and Pig-iron for Japan’, p.10.
  42. Griffith, ‘The Growing Militancy of the South Coast Branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation’, p.85. and Lockwood, War on the Waterfront, p.169.
  43. Griffith, ‘The Growing Militancy of the South Coast Branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation’, p.86.
  44. WWF South Coast Branch Minutes, NBAC/ANU Z 429 Box 53, Minutes of Special Meeting, 17 January, 1939.
  45. Ibid.
  46. Griffith, ‘The Growing Militancy of the South Coast Branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation’, p.86.
  47. WWF South Coast Branch File, NBAC/ANU T62/9/7/2, Letter from Healy to Roach, 25 January 1939.
  48. Roach, ‘Menzies and Pig-iron for Japan’, p.11.
  49. Lockwood, War on the Waterfront, p. 212.
  50. Margo Beasley, Wharfies: The History of the Waterside Workers’ Federation, Sydney: Halstead Press/Australian National Maritime Museum, 1996, p. 108.
  51. Christine Sutherwood Claridge, ‘The Sussex Street Men: A Study of the influence of The Communist Party of Australia on the Sydney Branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation: 1931-1948’, Ph.D Thesis, History Department, University of Queensland, 1994, pp. 181-182. The reference is Australian Archives (ACT) A42/40/1261, Subject Title: ‘Report containing decision of Cabinet not to impose an embargo on the export of pig-iron and scrap metal’, 18 October 1940, pp. 1-4.
  52. Roach Interview, September 1990.
  53. ‘Determined Stand At Port Kembla: Trade Union Movement Behind Our Members’, Maritime Worker, vol 1, no.10, 14 January, 1939, p.1.
  54. One of Ted Roach’s responsibilities as Assistant General Secretary from 1942 to 1954 was to liaise with all the branches in the country. He travelled extensiveley and met men who were in Port Kembla in 1938 who had obtianed full-time positions in thier respective branches. Roach Interview, September, 1990.
  55. Ibid.
  56. Beasley, Wharfies, pp. 127-130.
  57. Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada, Australasian Book Society, Sydney, 1975, pp. 134-139, 144-145 & 147-9.
  58. Roach ‘Menzies and Pig-iron for Japan’, Winter 1994, p. 11.