Warwick Eather and Drew Cottle
For six weeks from 1 March 1943, Newcastle unions and local branches of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) placed a black ban on publicans who restricted the sale of schooners (16 oz glasses) of draught beer from 4pm to 6 pm.The publicans were acting in accordance with directions issued by the New South Wales Branch of the United Licensed Victuallers’ Association (DLVA) and with the support of the Commonwealth ALP government of john Curtin. Both the ULVA and the government argued that the ban on the sale of schooners was designed to distribute supplies equitably, as brewers had been ordered by the Commonwealth government in 1942 to reduce production of beer by one-third. The government also wanted to reduce the incidence of drunkenness among the civilian and military populations.
The black ban did not result in the sale of schooners outside thedesignated two hours because of the Commonwealth government’s intransigence and the activities of the ULVA, yet the ban highlights two important Issues taken up by this article.The first concerns the growing influence of the Newcastle Trades Hall Council (NTH C), the unions and the ALP branches. After three years of consolidating their presence in local industry, especially in the BHP group of companies, the unions during 1943 were flexing their industrial muscles to alter what was essentially a non-industrial problem. The fact that the unions were able to maintain solidarity of their members until after it was evident that the government would not budge underlines their growing relevance in Newcastle.
The second focuses on the role and motivation of the ULVA. The ULVA leadership believed any violation of National Security Regulations governing the sale and distribution of alcohol would result in the federal government taking draconian steps to bring the industry into line, something the media and the prohibitionists repeatedly called for. Any change would not be temporary or just for the duration of the war, but imposed on the industry in perpetuity. As well, the ULVA wanted to maximise profitability during a time of rationing of supplies. Overtures to the government to ban the sale of pints and schooners had the potential to increase profits while also distributing available supplies to more people without encouraging drunkenness.Any member who did not ‘play the game’, as the ULVA called it, was informed on and penalised for threatening the future of the industry and the ULVA’s control of it.
The ULVA portrayed itself as acting in the national interest but the reality was that it was acting out of self-interest. In comparison, workers across the country and their unions, at times somewhat grudgingly, accepted higher rates of direct and indirect taxation, shelved their wage claims, suffered the censure of the media, politicians and the general public for undertaking strike action to protect their working conditions from the predatory attacks of employers, and bore the deleterious effects of a host of other changes and shortages. Historians know so much about union activities, but the actions of employers and their peak bodies have rarely undergone the same degree of scrutiny.
The published histories of the home front during World War II have not discussed the schooner ban. In his two volume official history, Hasluck concentrated on a range of matters that included the Austerity campaign of the Commonwealth government, manpower concerns, the increasing incidence of intoxication among troops and civilians, and the overwhelming desire of people and organisations to avoid the restrictions imposed on the liquor trade by the government.1 The overriding theme of Hasluck’s work is that Australians who objected to or avoided government decisions were disloyal and undermining the war effort, irrespective of the reasons for their response. In two of the economic volumes of the official history, Butlin, and Butlin and Schedvin focused on the effects of excise duties on industry, the ineffectiveness of the various regulations and the impact of the black market. In particular, Butlin and Schedvin emphasise that the restrictions on beer production, ‘[John] Curtin’s [the ALP prime minister] emotional obsession’, was ‘misguided … if only because of the man-hours wasted in liquor queues.2 These themes are advanced by McKernan, but he also mentions, albeit fleetingly, the failure of the schooner ban in NSW to reduce alcohol consumption.3 For her part, Darian-Smith is concerned about the high incidence of intoxication and the impact on public morality in Melbourne.4
Concerns with public morality before and during the’ war buttressed the efforts of various organisations who favoured prohibition. However they rarely met with success. Australians were, and still are, prolific drinkers of alcohol. This affection for the ‘drink’ also explains the dearth of examples of communities banning the consumption of alcohol for purely industrial or financial reasons. There is only one known example of this response, although others may lie in the archives undiscovered. For ten months from October 1929, workers in Mt Isa, Queensland, declared a ‘strike’ on beer consumption in an attempt to force local publicans to reverse pricing decisions that increased the price of a pint of draught beer to two shillings, and a ten ounce glass to one shilling. Local workers believed that the pint should cost no more than one shilling. By the time the ‘strike’ ended in August 1930, a pint cost Is 3d.5When faced with large price hikes, workers have often threatened a ban on consumption, as happened in Rochester, Victoria in January 1907, but they have generally not taken the decisive step.6
The analysis that follows commences with an examination of union organisation and power in Newcastle during the pre-war and early war years. It examines the black ban on the consumption of alcohol that was part of the NTHC’s protest against the 1940-41 Commonwealth budget, before examining government initiatives to restrict the production and sale of beer during 1941-42 and the culmination of local opposition in Newcastle to these moves in March-April 1943. It concludes with an analysis of the activities of the ULVA and the Commonwealth ALP government.
At the outset of World War II, the NTHC and individual unions were still struggling to overcome two decades of consistently high levels of unemployment and extremely low levels of unionisation, a result of the punitive and aggressive industrial policies pursued by employers, especially the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited group of companies. Morale was low among officials and members alike. Nevertheless, during 1939 the NTHC led and coordinated successful campaigns against the Menzies government’s Supply and Development Bill and the National Registration Bill – legislation that it considered to be little more than industrial conscription and an attack on trade union principles. Although all the communist led union branches, notably the Federated Ironworkers’ Association, the Federated Boilermakers’ Society of Australia and the Sheet Metal Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia, opposed the war in the period to 1941, the leadership of all local branches believed that the industrial struggle should not be shelved during the war. This view prevailed even aftet the NTHC and the unions endorsed a ‘no strike’ policy during 1941-42, and as the war situation deteriorated during 1943. The unions’ bargaining power was significantly increased by a combination of factors that included protection of union militants on-the-job by the National Security (Employment) Regulations, full employment in all trades and increasing rates of unionisation.The industrial pendulum was swinging towards labour for the first time in Newcastle’s industrial history This shift had a dramatic impact on the activities of all labour organisations in the city. The NTHC and the unions became more confident about their ability to enact change, especially as there were ALP governments at both the state and federal levels by late 1941, and they became increasingly vocal about a range of non-industrial matters that affected unionists in the city. 7
Local protests against the Menzies’ government’s 1940-41 budget was an early example of this growing confidence. The budget was draconian and it had the support of the ALP opposition. The government hoped to raise £150 million through higher rates of taxation, lowering of the tax threshold and increases in a range of duties on goods that were likely to be in scarce supply. The excise duty payable on beer production was increased by 9d per gallon to 2s 9d.8 The budget was greeted with hostility by unionists around the country. In Newcastle Al.P members were astonished that the federal ALP opposition had agreed to a document ‘that was nothing less than a vicious attack on the standards of the wage earners’ . 9 In protest, the NTHC and unions proposed holding a 24-hour stoppage on 20 January 1941 but did not do so because of the war situation. They did however impose an overtime ban and a black ban on the consumption of beer and all intoxicating liquors that were being sold at the new rates to protest at the increases in indirect taxes.The black ban commenced on 20 January and hotels were picketed until the ban was lifted on 13 February, with the budgetary measures still in place. The failure to achieve the desired aims was due to the grave war situation and the reluctance of unions to undertake strike action at this time and the federal parliamentary ALP’s acceptance of the budget. 10
During 1941-42, both the Commonwealth and NSW governments forced further changes on the liquor industry which had an impact on beer production, and on wholesale and retail prices.The newly installed Curtin ALP government listed beer as a ‘declared’ commodity in late 1941. Future changes to the price and supply of beer were governed by the Prices Commissioner, Professor Douglas Copland, and the Minister for Trade and Customs, Senator Richard Keane. The government also nearly doubled the excise on beer with two increases over a nine-month period, reaching 4s 9d per gallon in September 1942.These increases were designed to discourage consumption, increase revenue and to absorb the extra wages being earned by workers. The breweries and publicans passed them on in full, with retail price schedules adjusted under the National Security (Prices) Regulations to restrict excessive profitability. In March 1942, the government ordered breweries to cut output by one-third, and Keane imposed strict quotas on hotels to ensure that available supplies were distributed equitably. These measures were re-endorsed by Cabinet in. October 1942.A ban on bar sales of pints of draught beer, a measure that the ULVA had requested in late 1941 but one Copland had rejected because of possible problems in industrial centres, commenced in March 1942. During this same year, the McKell ALP government in NSW restricted hotel trading to between 11 am and 6pm, a reduction of two hours, banned the delivery of liquor except to licensed premises, and banned the sale of alcohol to women in public and saloon bars.11
The Newcastle Response
The increase in cost and reduction in supply resulted in NSW consumers switching to to schooners (16 oz and 11 pence), the largest available glass size and a more cost-effective form of consumption when compared to the smaller middy (9 oz and 7 pence).When this became known, the ULVA approached Copland, during October 1942, and asked for permission to restrict the sale of schooners to the hours of 4.30-6 pm, with the possibility of an extension if exceptional circumstances prevailed. As the government was eager to reduce consumption and to ensure equitable distribution, Keane agreed to the proposal. This information was conveyed to the ULVA and the trade notified by early November. 12 Hotels on the coalfields were not subject to the restriction until March 1944, probably a legacy of the miners’ aggressive industrial campaigns and the government’s desire not to provide any possible reason for further strike action, while Newcastle hotels were permitted to start selling schooners from 4pm, a result of a prevalence of shift workers. Initial attempts to enforce the schooner ban in Newcastle hotels were met with immediate opposition. Publicans in Carrington imposed the ban in late November only to be met with a black ban by the Coaltrimmers’ section of the Waterside Workers’ Federation (WWF), renowned heavy drinkers and the majority of the hotels’ patrons, which forced a swift return to schooners on demand in early December. 13
Through November and December 1942, most Newcastle and some Sydney hotels continued to sell schooners outside the stipulated hours. These continued violations prompted the ULVA again to approach Copland in December to see if he would allow it to cancel the brewery rebates of the offending publicans, a pre-war practice normally used against publicans engaged in price-cutting and therefore a strong incentive for publicans to toe the line. The rebate was paid to the publican by the brewery and was calculated on the amount of beer and spirits sold: £1 per 18-gallon keg of beer, 2s 6d per one dozen bottles of beet, and 12.5 per cent on spirits. In many cases the rebate was the major part of the publican’s profit margin. After he had consulted Keane, Copland provided the ULVA with the relevant authority by early January 1943, and ULVA Council moved quickly to enforce it.14 Over the next month the majority of hotels fell into line, which raised the ire of various local branches of the ALP, notably Georgetown/Waratah and Hamilton, and the trade unions. In response the Coaltrimmers reimposed their ban on 22 February and were joined the next day by the remainder of the WWF and the Federated Municipal and Shire Employees’ Union. 15 On 24 February the publicans of four hotels, the Exchange at Hamilton and the Colliery Inn, the Terminus and the Lemongrove at Wallsend, were informed by representatives of Tooths and Tooheys breweries that because they had continued to violate the schooner ban their rebates had been cancelled and they would have to pay for future deliveries either in advance or cash on delivery. These publicans, along with another four in Walls end , refused to accept their respective quotas on 27 February and 8 March, and Walls end publicans had no beer for sale by the latter date. 16
On 1 March 1943 a combined NTHC/ALP meeting, attended by 400 delegates who represented 30,000 workers, formally imposed the ban on all Newcastle hotels that refused to serve schooners on demand. Over the next 18 days the ban was endorsed by a majority of local unions, ALP branches and other organisations like the Wallsend sub-branch of the Returned Services League and the Northern Council of the Industrial Life Agents’ Association.The Seamen’s Union of Australia was the only union publicly to oppose the ban.The 1 March meeting also called for the reintroduction of stamped pint and half-pint glasses to standardise the sale of beer, and although this issue was advanced by Newcastle union leaders over the next 14 days, it had very little chance of success as the Commonwealth government, having banned pints 12 months earlier, had no intention of reintroducing them. 17 Deputations met with the federal Attorney-General, Dr H.V Evatt, on 3 March and with the NSW Chief Secretary, Mr J .M. Baddeley, on 14 March without success. The failure of the deputations led ALP branches in particular to call for the nationalisation of the liquor industry, all of which went unheeded. 18 Local unionists, for the most part, adhered to the ban, although hotels on the coalfields did a roaring trade at various times. The fact that union members who ignored the ban were liable to be fined by their union an amount of between £2 and £5 encouraged abstinence, and the WWF did impose fines of £5 on four of its thirsty members. 19
On 18 March, it looked as if the black ban had succeeded when a meeting chaired by David Watkins – MHR for Newcastle and one of a number of local politicians who had been in contact with Keane – and attended by representatives from the NTHC,ALP, ULVA and the victimised publicans, agreed that schooners would be served on demand. The black ban was lifted immediately and schooners flowed for the next seven days before again being banned by the DLVA, after Keane had issued a statement that he had never agreed to lifting the ban on sales and so it remained in place.20 On 24 March the NTHC/ALP met to reimpose the black ban, while the four publicans in dispute with the breweries, clearly suffering from the lack of business and from the pressure imposed by the DLVA, agreed to abide by DLVA policy and signed Statutory Declarations to this effect. 21 The unions held the line until early April, but in the face of government intransigence and employer unity they began to waver. On 5 April the WWF called for wholesale support of the ban or it should be lifted. On the same day a NTHC/ALP meeting refused to endorse a 48-hour stoppage in support of the ban because of the serious war situation and the need to maintain crucial production. This inaction angered the more hardline unions, particularly the WWFThe black ban-was lifted on 12 April at a meeting attended byonly 50 delegates, which indicates that the intensity of the dispute had been all but drained by this time.22 Restrictions on the sale of schooners were tightened even further during 1944-45 as production was reduced further due to a shortage of raw materials and manpower. However, the ban did not stop unionists from drinking; they brewed their own concoctions, turned to the black market or, when supplies were available, drank as much as they could in the time allowed from middy glasses.23
The ULVA and the Commonwealth government
The extent of Commonwealth government control over the production, distribution and sale of beer is evident. It is also clear that the ULVA did all it could to support government moves. The ULVA continually met with Copland and Keane to argue about any changes and their ramifications. In stark contrast to the Federated Wine and Spirit Merchants’ Association of Australia, which was doing everything possible to obstruct or resist government initiatives,24 the ULVA was overeager to act on the government’s behalf. It did so to remain in control of the day-to-day running of the industry, to be seen as acting responsibly during a national emergency to negate calls from prohibitionist groups for hotels to be closed for the duration of the war, and to maximise profitability at a time of reduced supplies and shorter hours of operation. Publicly, the ULVA continually defended its actions as a desire to ensure the equitable distribution of available supplies of beer to members of the public, but privately many of its members had only contempt for what the buying public desired.
Throughout 1941-42, the ULVA did everything possible to have members accept the restrictions and abide by them. Continually the leadership, especially the NSW and northern branch presidents, respectively N.H. Connolly and P.]. Ryan, argued that all members needed to ‘play the game’ to ensure the future of the industry, and the ULVA’s control of it. Not to do this would end in individuals having to pay hefty fines, the suspension of licences, but, more importantly, the imposition of changes on the entire industry that would never be reversed. This last threat was made all the more real by bureaucrats in the Department of Trade and Customs who repeatedly told the DLVA that if it could not control its members, the department would put in place measures to force compliance.25
As examples of what could happen, The ULVA Review continually ran editorials and stories on how the industry had accepted six o’clock closing for the duration of World War I and six months thereafter, only to have the closing time imposed throughout the inter-war period. It also referred to the prospect of the introduction of the ultimate horror, prohibition, if the Council of Churches in NSW, the NSW Temperance Alliance and the Australian Temperance Council were able to influence the Commonwealth government.26 The ULVA’s action in enforcing the schooner ban in Newcastle was part of the campaign to ‘play the game’ and to be seen as acting responsibly. The motivation for doing so was purely self-preservation.
Maximising profits was also about self-preservation. Beer prices were pegged by the Commonwealth government in October 1941 and were adjusted to allow for increases in excise duties. Publicans were guaranteed a margin of profit on each gallon of beer sold, and they could increase this rate with increased house and lounge sales – where commodities were charged at a higher rate than in public bars – and by spirit sales by the nip. The ULVA consistently argued that the margin on beer sales was being eroded but could not force changes to the regulations. 27 The ban on the sale of schooners outside specified hours was one of a number of ways publicans could improve their rate of profit. Spokesmen for the NTHC, the ALP and individual unions continually focused on this point without success. Senator Keane consistently argued that prices were pegged and there was no possibility of excessive profiting. This claim missed the point, because the issue was about profiting as a result of a commodity being sold in different and unstamped size glasses at different prices.An 18-gallon keg of draught beer could be served in 180 16-ounce schooners at lId each or 320 middies of nine ounces at 7d each, or a mixture of both. This had the potential to provide Is 2d a gallon extra profit if the entire keg was sold as middies, or approximately £1 Is per 18-gallon keg. Keggage rates are not known, but the four hotels that lost their rebates during the dispute were earning rebates of between £30 and £40 a week on beer alone.The extra amount, when combined with the brewery rebate, profits from bottle sales when they were available, increased lounge. and after hour sales, would have provided a reasonable level of profit. Union leaders regularly claimed that publicans deliberately withheld draught or bottled beer from sale in public bars, so they could sell it at increased profits after hours or in the lounges during normal hours.28
Members of the ULVA NSW Council were nonplussed by the actions of publicans who disobeyed the directive to restrict the sale of schooners. The recalcitrants were not only jeopardising their own livelihoods but also those of their fellow members and the future of tile industry.They were no different from a ‘price cutter’ and, as discussion at the Council’s meeting on 12 January 1943 indicates, they had to be brought into line:
Why worry about what the customer said in these days of limited .supplies or what the hotelkeeper across the way was doing? Those who use schooners would be at a decided disadvantage as had been shown in more ways than one. They had to be brought into line. It was, however, heartbreaking for members of the executive, who gave valuable time away from their own hotels to find this sort of thing happening. All they got was abuse.29
The ‘abused’ Council members had been publicans for many years, and as The ULVA Review pointed out at the outset of the schooner ban, ‘they would [not] recommend a policy that would be harmful’. 30 Harmful for the publican it was not, but it clearly ignored the needs and habits of the paying public.
It is surprising that the Commonwealth government, and an ALP one at that, would give up its rights to an outside employer body to enact and enforce policies. Both Keane and Copland believed that they were simply endorsing pre-war practices in the industry and saw the ULVA’s overtures as a way to save time and effort during what was obviously an extremely busy period. As the Newcastle Morning Herald editorialised on 26 March 1943:’ [t]he Government must have full control of such policies and should not allow a private organisation of traders to accept responsibility either for interpreting or enforcing them’ .The beer shortage was clearly very low on the government’s list of priorities. The federal caucus refused to discuss the issue in September 1942, 31 and the government’s aims were to reduce production and consumption. Local unionists and party members expected that ‘their’ governments at the state and federal levels would have acted in a more favourable manner, and were clearly frustrated when they did not.The government would not alter its arrangements with the ULVA and the state government was unable to change anything. So during 1944-45, when new disputes arose over the sale of beer, the NTHC negotiated on behalf of its members directly with the northern branch of the ULVA32
On 12 April 1943, Newcastle unionists ended their campaign to be able to purchase schooners of beer during all hotel trading hours. Six weeks earlier they had imposed a black ban on hoteliers who had refused to sell schooners on demand.They believed the ULVA was profiting from the wartime crises at their expense, and that more equitable methods of supply and consumption were available, especially the pint and half-pint. The fact that the ban was put in place at all indicates the growing strength of the unions and the NTHC, and the anger of the local ALP branches. Their initial target was the ULVA, but once the parties had learned of the full circumstances behind the schooner ban, their anger was directed at the Commonwealth government. The government’s aim was to reduce the production and consumption of beer, and the responsible minister empowered the ULVA to achieve the latter of these ends. The minister’s determination not to accede to the Newcastle demands sounded the death knell for the black ban and eventually forced the NTHC and the unions to lift it. Thereafter, Novocastrians abided by the regulations whenever beer was sold in hotels, and paid the higher prices for the privilege for the duration of the war.
Warwick Bather is an independent scholar who lives in Shanghai. His current research interests include the mobilisation of capital in Australia during the 1930s and 1940s, and a class analysis of the rabbit industry in Australia to 1950.
Drew Cottle teaches politics and history at the University of Western Sydney.
- P. Hasluck, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Civil Vol.1: The Government and the People 1939-1941, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1962 and Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Civil Vol. 2: The Government and the People 1932-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1970.
- S.J. Butlin, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Civil Vol.3:War Economy 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1955; S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Civil Vol.4:War Economy 1942-1945,Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1977·.
- Michael McKernan, All In! Australia During the Second World War, Nelson, Melbourne, 1983, pp.245-248.
- Kate Darian-Smith, On The Home Front: Melbourne in Wartime 1939-1945, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1990, pp. 170-173.
- Hall Greenland, Red Hot: The Life and Times of Nick Origlass, Wellington Lane Press, Neutral Bay, 1998, pp. 7-11.
- The Licensing Review, 19 January 1907 and The Age, 14 January 1907.
- Warwick Eather, The Trenches at Home:The Industrial Struggle in the Newcastle Iron and Steel Industry 1937-1947, PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 1986, ch. 1-3.
- Hasluck, Australia in the War Vol. 2, p. 275; The Official Year Book of New South Wales 1942- 2 and 1942-43, p. 196.
- Newcastle Federal Electorate Council, minutes, 24 November 1940, Newcastle University Archives (NUA)/AB2646; Tighes Hill Branch, ALP. minutes, 15 December 1940, NUA/AB2643.
- Newcastle Trades Hall Council (NTHC), minutes, 30 January 1941 and 13 February 1941, NUA/A5122;Newcastle Morning Herald (NMH), 20-31 January 1941.
- The Official Year Book of New South Wales 1942-42 and 1942-43,p.196;’National Security (General) Regulations: Control of Liquor Order’, Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 16 March 1942; Circular: R.D. Hatfield, General Secretary.The United Licensed Victuallers Association, New South Wales. Branch (ULVA) to Dear Sir or Madam, 27 March 1942 and Memorandum: Department of Trade and Customs, ‘Control of Liquor Order’, 4 April 1942, Tooth & Co. Limited Collection, Noel Butlin Archives Centre (NBAC)/N20/2921; The ULVA Review, 1941-1942.
- 12. NMH,4 March 1943; ULVA, Council minutes, 10 November 1942,9 December 1942 and 12 January 194″., NBAC/ZI95/Box 6; The ULVA Review, 16 November 1942 and 15 December 1942.
- NMH, 26 February 1943 and 2 March 1943; The VLVA Review, 16 March 1944.
- ULVA, Council minutes, 10 November 1942,9 December 1942 and 12 January 1943, NBAC/ Z195/Box 6.
- NMH, 23-24 February 1943.
- E. Keegan,Tooths, to WP.Tripet, Manager,Tooth & Co. LImited, Newcastle, 25 February 1943 and Tripet to The City Manager, Sydney, 25 February 1943, NBAC/N20/1342; NMH, 9 March 1943.
- NTHC, minutes of special meeting. 15 March 1943 NUA/A5122; NMH, 2 March 1943.
- NTHC, minutes of special meetings, 15-24 March 19-13 and 5-12April 1943, NUA/A5122.
- NMH, 4-31 March 1943.
- Ibid., 18-22 March 1943.
- Ibid., 25 March 1943; R.D. Hadfield, ULVA to T. Watson Esq, General Manager Toorhs, Sydney, 30 March 1943, NBAC/N20/2921. Hadfield’s letter enclosed a copy of the Statutory Declaration.
- NTHC, minutes of special meeting, 5-12 April 1943, NUA/A5122; NMH, 6 April 1943.
- The ULVA Review, November 1944-February 1945.
- Butlin and Schedvin, War Economy 1942-1945, p. 178.
- The ULVA Review, April-September 1942.
- Ibid., May-September 1942 and 15 May 1943.
- ‘Minute Paper: Spirituous Liquors’, Australian Archives: CP 386/1/1/P49/300; The ULVA Review, 16 February 1942 and 16 November 1942.
- NMH, 25-26 February and 1,5 and 15 March 1943; Newcastle Sun, 26 February 1943.
- The ULVA Review, 15 January 1943.
- Ibid.,16 November 1942.
- PatrickWeller (ed.), Caucus Minutes 1901-1949, Minutes of the Meetings of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, Vol 3, 1932-49, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1975, p 303.
- NTHC, minutes, 8 October 1942-12 April 1943, NllA/A5122 and 7 September-16 November 1944, NUA/A5123; NMH, 12 January 1945 and 22 February 1945.